The protester, incumbent contractor Manus Medical, challenged the VA’s use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) procurement procedures for a $98.5 million sterile procedure packs contract. The protester argued that the solicitation’s technical evaluation factors—including transition plans, web-based systems, and EDI requirements—would provide more than minimal value if proposals exceeded minimum requirements, violating FAR 15.101-2(c). The court agreed, finding the VA failed to justify LPTA use and that several technical factors inappropriately required subjective evaluation.
Manus Medical, LLC v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, No. 26-538
Background – The Department of Veterans Affairs issued a solicitation for custom sterile procedure packs and associated services for 35 VA medical facilities. The maximum contract value was $98.5 million over five years. The VA decided to use LPTA procedures, evaluating offers on price, technical acceptability (six subfactors), and experience. Manus Medical, a service-disabled veteran-owned small business holding the current bridge contract, protested. Manus argued that LPTA was inappropriate because the solicitation’s technical requirements would benefit from qualitative tradeoffs rather than pass/fail acceptability determinations. The protester also challenged the VA’s failure to properly document its LPTA justification as required by regulation.
Insufficient LPTA Justification – The protester argued the contracting officer failed to properly justify using LPTA procedures as required by FAR 15.101-2(c)(6). FAR 15.101-2(c)(6) requires agencies to “document the contract file describing the circumstances that justify the use of lowest price, technically acceptable source selection process.” The court found the VA’s justifications merely restated the regulatory language without explaining how the specific requirements met LPTA criteria. In three separate justification documents, the VA provided only conclusory statements and failed to address the “associated services” portions of the solicitation. The court held that simply repeating legal standards as conclusions does not satisfy documentation requirements. While this violation made the LPTA use unlawful, the court found it did not independently prejudice the protester since the harm stemmed from the underlying substantive violations rather than the documentation failure itself.
Transition Plan Requirements – The protester challenged the 120-day transition plan requirement, arguing the VA would realize more than minimal value from faster transitions, violating FAR 15.101-2(c)(2). FAR 15.101-2(c)(2) requires agencies to “realize no, or minimal, value from a proposal that exceeds the minimum technical or performance requirements.” The court agreed with the protester. The VA’s own acquisition plan identified serious risks from delayed transitions, including cancelled surgeries for veterans. The VA’s market research also showed contractors could complete transitions in varying timeframes. The court found it irrational for the VA to claim no value from proposals completing transition in less than 120 days when the agency clearly identified harms from delays.
Web-Based System Evaluation – The protester argued the web-based system requirement violated multiple LPTA criteria because evaluating whether systems “easily identify” pack characteristics requires subjective judgment. The court agreed on two grounds. First, under FAR 15.101-2(c)(3), technical proposals must “require no, or minimal, subjective judgment by the source selection authority as to the desirability of one offeror’s proposal versus a competing proposal.” The requirement that systems provide “easy identification” is inherently subjective—there is no objective measure of what constitutes “easy.” Second, under FAR 15.101-2(c)(4), the agency must have “a high degree of confidence that reviewing the technical proposals of all offerors would not result in the identification of characteristics that could provide value or benefit.” The VA’s own market research identified multiple subjective characteristics of web-based systems it found valuable.
Experience Factor Treatment – The government argued that FAR 15.101-2(c)(3) and (c)(4)—which use the term “technical proposals”—do not apply to the solicitation’s experience factor, which is a separate non-technical evaluation factor. The court agreed with this statutory interpretation. When Congress uses different language in different subsections, courts presume intentional meaning. The court applied the canon that the “disparate inclusion or exclusion” of terms indicates purposeful distinction. Because subsections (c)(3) and (c)(4) specifically reference “technical proposals” while other subsections do not, these provisions apply only to technical factors. This meant the protester’s challenges to the experience requirement under these subsections failed. However, the solicitation still violated LPTA requirements through its technical subfactors, which was sufficient to grant relief.
Prejudice and Injunctive Relief – To obtain relief in a pre-award protest, the protester must show “a non-trivial competitive injury which can be redressed by judicial relief.” The protester demonstrated prejudice by showing it was qualified to compete (holding the current bridge contract) but that LPTA procedures favored larger competitors with economies of scale who could offer lower prices. Under proper tradeoff procedures considering technical merit and past performance alongside price, the protester would be in a better competitive position. The court granted injunctive relief.
The plaintiff is represented by Daniel J. Figuenick, III, Jonathan T. Williams, Eric A. Valle, Abigail Finan, and Adel K. H. Mansour of PilieroMazza PLLC. The government is represented by Yariv S. Pierce of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Natica C. Neely of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, and Barton B. Evans of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs.